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This paper deals with the religious beliefs of Randolph Hughes, an 
Australian literary figure of the first half of the twentieth century. A student 
of Christopher Brennan, Hughes violently rejected Christianity and 
adopted his own philosophical/ aesthetic religion based on the primacy of 
creativity. His religious beliefs led him to support Nazism during the 
1930s. This paper examines his religious ideals, his criticisms of 
Christianity and the connections between those ideas and his view of the 
nature of European civilisation. It concludes that his attempts to find a 
substitute for Christianity in a religion of beauty led Hughes to a narrow 
and intolerant dogmatism that could be described as fundamentalist in 
nature. 
Randolph Hughes was a man who violently rejected Christianity and whose 
intellectual and spiritual orientation was defined by that rejection. He called himself 
a religious and spiritual man and he advocated a form ofreligion grounded in an 
aesthetic doctrine that saw the road to God through beauty. He was led to hail Hitler 
and Nazism as the vehicles of the spiritual renewal of a Europe that would embody 
Hughes's religious principles. Nevertheless Hughes found himself in a world of 
Christians and constantly sought to define himself in opposition to their beliefs and 
values. In I933 he accepted a proposal from the Reverend Walter Matthews, 
theologian and future Dean of St Pauls, that together they produce a statement 
containing both the Christian and anti-Christian points of view, though the project 
never eventuated (Hughes to Walter Matthews, 30 Aprili933, Papers, I 0: 3). Hughes 
had many Christian correspondents with whom he both fought and insulted. Hughes's 
intellectual and spiritual life was a constant battle against a Christianity that continued 
to fascinate him even as he swore eternal enmity to it. This paper is a contribution 
towards understanding an individual who clearly saw himself as a religious man and 
who sought to define the meaning of religion in terms that were non-Christian and 
largely aesthetic and aristocratic in nature. This position led him to what might be 
termed the 'fascist temptation'. To understand this process it will examine firstly 
Hughes's life, as many of his ideas have their roots in his personal circumstances, 
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followed by a consideration of his opposition to Christianity and an examination of 
what he believed to be true religion. 
Life History 
Hughes is best remembered (Melleuish, 1996a: 513--4) as a literary figure who 
wrote the first major study of the poet Christopher Brennan, edited two works of 
Swinburne and wrote widely on nineteenth century French and English poetry (Hughes 
1934, 1942, 1952). He was born and educated in Australia but left to fight in the 
Middle East in 19I5 and never returned. His early years are difficult to reconstruct. 
He was apparently brought up as a Congregationalist and he maintained a 
correspondence with his childhood friend, the Reverend Bernard Cockett, for most 
ofhis life. He appears in A. R. Chisholm's memoirs as an excitable Romantic young 
man who looked upon Australia as 'place of exile' and who 'usually wore gloves and 
carried a cane' (Chisholm, 1958: 59). In a letter late in life he stated that he would 
have attended Winchester school in England had not the family fortune been destroyed 
in the Depression of the I890s (Hughes to Guy Howarth, 9 August 1949, Papers, 34: 
189). According to Chisholm, Hughes attached himself to the poet Christopher 
Brennan and he remained a lifelong disciple of Brennan (Chisholm, 1958: 60). 
At the University of Sydney he was part of that extraordinary generation that 
emerged just prior to World War I, a generation that was saturated in Romantic 
ideals that were both Christian and classical in origin, ideals which can be found 
expressed, for example, in the pages of the University of Sydney magazine Hermes. 
Consider the following specimen of Hughes' poetry (Hughes, I9I2): 
'Will any light be shed in any place 
Upon me of thy amorous perfect face? 
Will anywhere again my passion's drouth 
Be Saturate with kisses of thy mouth? 
After World War I Hughes took a first class honours degree at Oxford. He 
taught at French universities, including the famous Ecole Normale Superiere, before 
taking up a lectureship at Kings College, the University of London. At some point 
during these years, probably when he was studying at Oxford, he underwent some 
sort of nervous breakdown (Hughes to Netterville Barron, 16 February 1930, Papers, 
7: 325-339). After an acrimonious dispute Hughes left his academic position in the 
mid 1930s, railing against the Jewish Principal of King's College William Halliday 
(see Hughes to Guy Hamilton, 12 February 1941, Papers 7: 373). He hoped to 
become a free-lance writer; he survived by marking examinations. He was swept up 
in the maelstrom ofthe 1930s, attending the 1936 Nuremburg Rally, writing in support 
of Nazi Germany while condemning democracy and the Third French Republic and 
·extending his intellectual networks to include major figures in the Action Franyaise. 
All the time he continued his literary work on Mallarme, Baudelaire and Swinburne, 
publishing in both English and French journals. Nevertheless he wanted to be 
considered a creative writer and spent much of the early 1940s at work on an 
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followed by a consideration of his opposition to Christianity and an examination of 
what he believed to be true religion. 
Life History 
Hughes is best remembered (Melleuish, 1996a: 513-4) as a literary figure who 
wrote the first major study of the poet Christopher Brennan, edited two works of 
Swinburne and wrote widely on nineteenth century French and English poetry (Hughes 
1934, 1942, 1952). He was born and educated in Australia but left to fight in the 
Middle East in 1915 and never returned. His early years are difficult to reconstruct. 
He was apparently brought up as a Congregationalist and he maintained a 
correspondence with his childhood friend, the Reverend Bernard Cockett, for most 
ofhis life. He appears in A. R. Chisholm's memoirs as an excitable Romantic young 
man who looked upon Australia as 'place of exile' and who 'usually wore gloves and 
carried a cane' (Chisholm, 1958: 59). In a letter late in life he stated that he would 
have attended Winchester school in England had not the family fortune been destroyed 
in the Depression of the 1890s (Hughes to Guy Howarth, 9 August 1949, Papers, 34: 
189). According to Chisholm, Hughes attached himself to the poet Christopher 
Brennan and he remained a lifelong disciple of Brennan (Chisholm, 1958: 60). 
At the University of Sydney he was part of that extraordinary generation that 
emerged just prior to World War I, a generation that was saturated in Romantic 
ideals that were both Christian and classical in origin, ideals which can be found 
expressed, for example, in the pages ofthe University of Sydney magazine Hermes. 
Consider the following specimen of Hughes' poetry (Hughes, 1912): 
'Will any light be shed in any place 
Upon me of thy amorous perfect face? 
Will anywhere again my passion's drouth 
Be Saturate with kisses of thy mouth? 
After World War I Hughes took a first class honours degree at Oxford. He 
taught at French universities, including the famous Ecole Normale Superiere, before 
taking up a lectureship at Kings College, the University of London. At some point 
during these years, probably when he was studying at Oxford, he underwent some 
sort of nervous breakdown (Hughes to Netterville Barron, 16 February 1930, Papers, 
7: 325-339). After an acrimonious dispute Hughes left his academic position in the 
mid 1930s, railing against the Jewish Principal of King's College William Halliday 
(see Hughes to Guy Hamilton, 12 February 1941, Papers 7: 373). He hoped to 
become a free-lance writer; he survived by marking examinations. He was swept up 
in the maelstrom ofthe 1930s, attending the 1936 Nuremburg Rally, writing in support 
of Nazi Germany while condemning democracy and the Third French Republic and 
·extending his intellectual networks to include major figures in the Action Fran9aise. 
All the time he continued his literary work on Mallarme, Baudelaire and Swinburne, 
publishing in both English and French journals. Nevertheless he wanted to be 
considered a creative writer and spent much of the early 1940s at work on an 
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unpublished novel 'Lost Eurydice' that is perhaps most remarkable for its concern 
with both sex and violence (Hughes Papers, vol. 43). He felt frustrated and believed 
that he had not fulfilled his creative potential. 
The above sketch indicates that Hughes was a complex character. From an 
early age he felt at odds with the society around him, pursued Romantic ideals and 
was disillusioned when the world evaded those ideals. He clearly felt that he was 
destined for better things than had been granted to him and this led to a bitterness and 
a tendency to fight with those around him. Emotionally unstable and increasingly 
physically unwell, his main objective in life seemed to be to justifY himself and his 
work. He needed to see himself as an aristocratic figure superior to the democratic 
Australia in which he had grown up and to define himself as both a 'High Tory' and 
the heir to a great tradition of spiritual insight (Hughes to Delebecque, 8 December, 
1935, Papers, 19: 29). Hughes instinctively came to view himself as a genuinely 
spiritual and religious man seeking to defend civilisation, civilised values and an 
aristocratic ideal of creativity and spiritual achievement against those forces that 
threatened to destroy them. 
Central Influences 
The major intellectual influences on Hughes emphasised the importance of 
European high culture and the need for an aristocratic outlook on life. In part this 
came from Brennan and Brennan's views on Romanticism and Symbolist poetry, but 
this is, as John Docker (1974) has pointed out, very much a Sydney intellectual 
tradition. Roslyn Pesman Cooper ( 1989) has correctly traced the source of much 
intellectual sympathy for Fascism in Australia to the circle that formed around Brennan 
in the early 1920s. Although Hughes was not a member of that circle his good friend 
Alan Chisholm was. In his vision of the creative artist, Hughes also resembles the 
Norman Lindsay of Creative Effort who wrote that 'one thing alone in existence is 
manifest, pennanent, indestructible, and that is the individual effort to create thought 
and beauty' (1924: 16). Hughes had strong links with both Lionel Lindsay and 
Norman's communist son, Jack (Hawke, 2000). It is clear that Hughes's aristocratic 
vision was born in an Australia dedicated to 'democracy' and unsure ofhow to respond 
to those who claimed the privilege of creativity. In Hughes's case this was no doubt 
intensified by the fear that he perhaps did not really possess creative gifts. 
This passionate desire to destroy Christianity as the antithesis of the traditions 
of European civilisation can in part be seen as the desire of an 'aristocrat', unsure of 
his genuine superiority, to have his revenge on democracy. It led Hughes to look 
upon Nazi Gennany as the great hope that would restore Europe to its true pre-Christian 
ideals. It is the starting point for an understanding of Hughes's religious outlook. 
What I should like to do now is to examine Hughes's criticisms of Christianity, 
and then consider Hughes's view of the nature of true spiritual religion. To do this it 
is necessary to make extensive use of Hughes's unpublished correspondence. Here 
can be found letters that are often mini-essays on a range of political, aesthetic and 
religious topics. 
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Hughes' Anti-Christianity 
In a letter to Nesta Webster Hughes claimed that his objections to Christianity 
were ethical and metaphysical, but he also had another set of objections that may best 
be described as the impact of Christian values on European civilisation. The basis of 
his ethical objections to Christianity was his view that the doctrine of atonement and 
the idea of vicarious redemption, which he described as the 'central and essential 
doctrine' of Christianity, 'cuts away at the very foundation of the truly moral life' 
(Hughes to Nesta Webster, 12 September, 1938, Papers, 24: 53). Against this Christian 
doctrine Hughes held to an essentially classical set of virtues with courage, 
independence and the capacity of not needing to rely on external support as the primary 
values. 'For me', claimed Hughes 'the only true moral progress lies in accepting 
fully the consequences of one's actions, in making one's own way towards what one 
recognises as Perfection'. Hughes believed that Christianity undermined this 
imperative that individuals take full responsibility for their actions and was therefore 
ethically pernicious. For him the 'only salvation worth having ... is that which one 
wins for oneself' (Hughes to Jacques Delebecque, 29 April, 1936, Papers, 19: 67). If 
the primary values are courage and independence then the Christian values of 
'meekness and humility' are to be despised rather than admired. Hughes invoked the 
idea ofNietzsche that Christianity leads to the creation of a 'slave morality'. 
Hughes also found the figure of Christ unattractive. His friend Alan Chisholm, 
a non-believer sympathetic to Christianity, wrote to him in 1946 claiming that 'in the 
actual teaching of Christ there was something of enduring value', invoking 'real 
Christian values' and expressing a sympathy for the writings ofKirkegaard (Chisholm 
to Hughes, 12 February, 1946, Papers, 4: 526- 527). Hughes's response was 
contemptuous. He declared that the figure of Christ was 'alien and antipathetic' and 
continued that he could not respect Christ. Stating that his two tests for greatness 
were intellectual power and the spiritual power able to create beauty he proclaimed 
that Christ was 'noteless to the point of being a nullity' and 'mindless' (Hughes to 
Chisholm, I May 1946, Papers, 4: 541). 
Creativity, power and a positive outlook were the primary values for Hughes, 
and these stood in stark contrast to the Christian emphasis on humility and self-
denial. He saw the Sermon on the Mount as an abdication of virility and the creative 
faculties. In particular he savagely attacked the Christian condemnation of pride. 
Writing to Edwyn Bevan, committed Christian and historian of the Hellenistic age, 
he argued that pride was the basis of all that was worthwhile in life, including courage, 
higher morality, passionate love, enrichment of the imagination and the supreme 
things in music, literature and artistic activity (Hughes to Bevan, 20 October, 1937, 
Papers, 7: 177, 179). Hughes's specific targets were Paul and Augustine because 
they condemned pride. In a review of Rebecca West's book on Augustine, he 
characterised Augustine as morbid and pathological, 'almost insane' in his fear of 
beauty, and continued by saying that the same feeling is strong in St. Paul. This 
aversion to beauty had, Hughes contended, made 'its annP'm'"~~ £_ __ 
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'meekness and humility' are to be despised rather than admired. Hughes invoked the 
idea of Nietzsche that Christianity leads to the creation of a 'slave morality'. 
Hughes also found the figure of Christ unattractive. His friend Alan Chisholm, 
a non-believer sympathetic to Christianity, wrote to him in 1946 claiming that 'in the 
actual teaching of Christ there was something of enduring value', invoking 'real 
Christian values' and expressing a sympathy for the writings ofKirkegaard (Chisholm 
to Hughes, 12 February, 1946, Papers, 4: 526- 527). Hughes's response was 
contemptuous. He declared that the figure of Christ was 'alien and antipathetic' and 
continued that he could not respect Christ. Stating that his two tests for greatness 
were intellectual power and the spiritual power able to create beauty he proclaimed 
that Christ was 'noteless to the point of being a nullity' and 'mindless' (Hughes to 
Chisholm, 1 May 1946, Papers, 4: 541 ). 
Creativity, power and a positive outlook were the primary values for Hughes, 
and these stood in stark contrast to the Christian emphasis on humility and self-
denial. He saw the Sermon on the Mount as an abdication of virility and the creative 
faculties. In particular he savagely attacked the Christian condemnation of pride. 
Writing to Edwyn Bevan, committed Christian and historian of the Hellenistic age, 
he argued that pride was the basis of all that was worthwhile in life, including courage, 
higher morality, passionate love, enrichment of the imagination and the supreme 
things in music, literature and artistic activity (Hughes to Bevan, 20 October, 1937, 
Papers, 7: 177, 179). Hughes's specific targets were Paul and Augustine because 
they condemned pride. In a review of Rebecca West's book on Augustine, he 
characterised Augustine as morbid and pathological, 'almost insane' in his fear of 
beauty, and continued by saying that the same feeling is strong in St. Paul. This 
aversion to beauty had, Hughes contended, made 'its appearance frequently as a 
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poisoning force in European thought'. Hughes used this opportunity to express his 
view of the relationship between beauty and religion. He claimed that 'in the artistic 
beauty of the singing there is far more religion than in the mere meaning of the 
words; that all true art is ultimately religion, and religion in the highest'. Augustine, 
he concluded, was 'one of the sorriest figures in history' (Hughes, I933: 6I 7). In its 
pernicious effects on true religion and European civilisation, Christianity for Hughes, 
as we shall see, was not a force for good. 
Hughes considered that Christianity's negative moral values had had other 
baneful consequences. He believed that Christianity had led men to develop an 
obsession with self, to deny life in the practice of chastity and neglect their family, 
social and political duties, their duties as citizens. 'A Christian', claimed Hughes 
'cannot be a good citizen' (Hughes to Bevan, 20 October I 937, Papers, 7: I 79). This 
argument, so reminiscent of Machiavelli ( 1970:278) and Rousseau (1968: I 08-115), 
derives from classical republicanism and is again essentially an attack on Christian 
universalism in the name of the virtues of classical paganism. In summary, Hughes 
opposed Christianity on ethical grounds because what he saw as its central values of 
humility and meekness stood in stark opposition to those classical values of courage, 
creativity and individual responsibility that he held dear. One can see a Nietzschian 
element in this opposition, as in Hughes's affirmation of the value of pride as something 
world-affirming, but as in the arguments regarding citizenship it is possible to see a 
much longer tradition of classical opposition to Christian values. Unlike Norman 
Lindsay, Hughes did not invoke Nietzsche as a primary weapon against Christianity. 
He did not believe either that God was dead or that the modern age had killed Him 
(Girard, 1984). Rather he considered that men like himself were helping to give birth 
to God through their creative efforts. Hughes was reverting to a much older tension 
within European civilisation between Christianity and Graeco-Roman classicism, 
between magnanimity and humility. As Pierre Manent has put it, 'Magnanimity 
despises humility and humility humiliates magnanimity, as it did at Canossa' (Manent, 
1998: 25). 
In terms of his metaphysical critique of Christianity, Hughes was quite blunt. 
He accepted that there is a deity and a world of the spirit, and claimed to 'care 
supremely for this spiritual world' (Hughes to Bevan, 9 August I 929, Papers, 7: 13). 
He simply believed that the addition of Christ adds nothing to that world. The dogmas 
of Christianity are neither true nor necessary; there was no need for Christ's 
intervention in the world. He claimed that 'To introduce Christ is completely 
unnecessary and gratuitous' (Hughes to Jacques Delebecque, 29 April1936, Papers, 
I 9:69). Writing to Bevan he said that 'if the dogma and ritual of Christianity were 
held to be simply symbolical of certain facts of our inner and deepest life, they would 
not be unacceptable' (Hughes to Bevan, 9 August 1929, Papers, 7: 15). At a more 
fundamental level Hughes could not accept the idea of an omnipotent perfect deity. 
For Hughes, God was not complete or perfect but 'precariously' on His way 'towards 
perfection and fullness of power' (Hughes to Walter Matthews, Hughes Papers, I 0:53). 
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God was moving towards the goal of omnipotence but needed to be helped on His 
way, and man had a role to play in this process of completing God. Commenting on 
Bousset's philosophy of history, Hughes claimed that the idea of an omnipotent God 
acting through history led to fatalism and determinism and was difficult to reconcile 
with the moral imperative of human responsibility (Hughes to Jacques Delebecque, 
9 October 1938, Papers, 19:283). Only a God proceeding towards perfection could 
resolve that problem for Hughes and his position on this question will be considered 
later in the paper. 
Christianity and European civilisation 
In general, however, Hughes's real objections to Christianity focused on the 
damaging impact that he believed it had had on European civilisation. For Hughes, 
Christianity was opposed to the development of the true European Spirit; what was 
best in European civilisation was pre-Christian in origin (Hughes to Chisholm, 1 
May 1946, Papers, 4:539). Hence he could speak of 'that Graeco-Roman and later 
European culture whence England derives the most precious elements ofher spiritual 
life' (Hughes to Lindfield, 6 December 1936, Papers, I 4:415). Hughes set up a 
dichotomy between Graeco-Roman civilisation and its positive values of creativity 
and spirituality and the enemies of those values which included Democracy, Jewry, 
Christianity and America. Opposing Christianity meant opposing democracy because 
'democracy is indeed the Christian polity par excellence' (Hughes to Jacques 
Delebecque, 5 February 1940, Papers, 19:439). And in his. later years it meant a 
violent anti-Americanism, including the hope that the Russians would bomb America 
- 'this Caliban among nations' - out of existence (Hughes to Chisholm, 1 0 December 
1945, Papers, 4:509). 
In the 1930s, however, Hughes's defence of what he saw as the virtues of 
European civilisation meant anti-semitism, anti-Christianity and support for Hitler 
and the Nazi regime in Germany. Hughes argued that both Christianity and Judaism 
were alien to European civilisation and had invaded Graeco-Roman civilisation, 
corrupting and weakening it (Hughes to Bernard Cockett, 13 June 1945, Papers, . 
I 0:389). He followed the argument developed by the French thinker, and founder of 
the Action Fran(,:aise, Charles Maurras, that the Jews were essentially 'Oriental' and 
'alien' to Europeans, that they were 'parasitic' and 'not creative'. In a letter to Maurras 
in 1937 he wrote that 'le genie juif, par exemple, Iequel, etant de sa vraie nature 
oriental ... n'est pas assimilable par une civilisation telle que Ia notre' (the Jewish 
genius, being in its true nature oriental, cannot be assimilated by our civilisation) 
(Hughes to Maurras, 26 March 1937, Papers, 25 :7). Christianity, for Hughes, was no 
more than a continuation of Judaism, an 'extension of this Oriental creed which is 
repugnant to my instincts as well as to my thinking self' (Hughes to Nesta Webster, 
12 September 1938, Papers, 24:53). Hughes believed that Christianity was 'the greatest 
evil against which what is best in civilization has to contend' (Hughes to Carl Kaeppel, 
17 November I 937, Papers, 9:293). European civilisation for him could only be 
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obsession with self, to deny life in the practice of chastity and neglect their family, 
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argument, so reminiscent of Machiavelli (1970:278) and Rousseau (1968: 1 08-115), 
derives from classical republicanism and is again essentially an attack on Christian 
universalism in the name of the virtues of classical paganism. In summary, Hughes 
opposed Christianity on ethical grounds because what he saw as its central values of 
humility and meekness stood in stark opposition to those classical values of courage, 
creativity and individual responsibility that he held dear. One can see a Nietzschian 
element in this opposition, as in Hughes's affrrmation of the value of pride as something 
world-affirming, but as in the arguments regarding citizenship it is possible to see a 
much longer tradition of classical opposition to Christian values. Unlike Norman 
Lindsay, Hughes did not invoke Nietzsche as a primary weapon against Christianity. 
He did not believe either that God was dead or that the modem age had killed Him 
(Girard, 1984). Rather he considered that men like himself were helping to give birth 
to God through their creative efforts. Hughes was reverting to a much older tension 
within European civilisation between Christianity and Graeco-Roman classicism, 
between magnanimity and humility. As Pierre Manent has put it, 'Magnanimity 
despises humility and humility humiliates magnanimity, as it did at Canossa' (Manent, 
1998: 25). 
In terms of his metaphysical critique of Christianity, Hughes was quite blunt. 
He accepted that there is a deity and a world of the spirit, and claimed to 'care 
supremely for this spiritual world' (Hughes to Bevan, 9 August 1929, Papers, 7: 13). 
He simply believed that the addition of Christ adds nothing to that world. The dogmas 
of Christianity are neither true nor necessary; there was no need for Christ's 
intervention in the world. He claimed that 'To introduce Christ is completely 
unnecessary and gratuitous' (Hughes to Jacques Delebecque, 29 April 1936, Papers, 
19:69). Writing to Bevan he said that 'ifthe dogma and ritual of Christianity were 
held to be simply symbolical of certain facts of our inner and deepest life, they would 
not be unacceptable' (Hughes to Bevan, 9 August 1929, Papers, 7:15). At a more 
fundamental level Hughes could not accept the idea of an omnipotent perfect deity. 
For Hughes, God was not complete or perfect but 'precariously' on His way 'towards 
perfection and fullness of power' (Hughes to Walter Matthews, Hughes Papers, I 0:53). 
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life' (Hughes to Lindfield, 6 December 1936, Papers, 14:415). Hughes set up a 
dichotomy between Graeco-Roman civilisation and its positive values of creativity 
and spirituality and the enemies ofthose values which included Democracy, Jewry, 
Christianity and America. Opposing Christianity meant opposing democracy because 
'democracy is indeed the Christian polity par excellence' (Hughes to Jacques 
Delebecque, 5 February 1940, Papers, 19:439). And in his later years it meant a 
violent anti-Americanism, including the hope that the Russians would bomb America 
-'this Caliban among nations'- out of existence (Hughes to Chisholm, 10 December 
1945, Papers, 4:509). 
In the 1930s, however, Hughes's defence of what he saw as the virtues of 
European civilisation meant anti-semitism, anti-Christianity and support for Hitler 
and the Nazi regime in Germany. Hughes argued that both Christianity and Judaism 
were alien to European civilisation and had invaded Graeco-Roman civilisation, 
corrupting and weakening it (Hughes to Bernard Cockett, 13 June 1945, Papers, 
I 0:389). He followed the argument developed by the French thinker, and founder of 
the Action Fran~aise, Charles Maurras, that the Jews were essentially 'Oriental' and 
'alien' to Europeans, thatthey were 'parasitic' and 'not creative'. In a letter to Maurras 
in 1937 he wrote that 'le genie juif, par exemple, lequel, etant de sa vraie nature 
oriental ... n'est pas assimilable par une civilisation telle que Ia notre' (the Jewish 
genius, being in its true nature oriental, cannot be assimilated by our civilisation) 
(Hughes to Maurras, 26 March 1937, Papers, 25:7). Christianity, for Hughes, was no 
more than a continuation of Judaism, an 'extension of this Oriental creed which is 
repugnant to my instincts as well as to my thinking self (Hughes to Nesta Webster, 
12 September 1938, Papers, 24:53). Hughes believed that Christianity was 'the greatest 
evil against which what is best in civilization has to contend' (Hughes to Carl Kaeppel, 
17 November 1937, Papers, 9:293). European civilisation for him could only be 
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defined in classical Graeco-Roman terms; Judaism and Christianity were its oriental 
antithesis. This was an extension of the Maurassian critique of Judaism (Sutton, 1982), 
although Maurras limited the Semitic influence in Christianity to Protestantism; for 
him Catholicism had a strong classical core. Hughes happily included Catholics as 
part of what he saw as a harmful oriental infection. 
If Christianity, for Hughes was 'an alien, disturbing and deteriovative force 
iruptive into the true elements of this civilization', then it was necessary to expel 
these parasitic, oriental values in favour of true life-affirming religious values (Hughes 
to Chisholm, I May 1946, Papers, 4:539). This meant support for Hitler. Hughes 
expressed the view that Hitler was getting rid of Christian and Jewish values from the 
German state (Hughes to Gilbert Murray, 1 September 1937, Papers, 3:3). Nazi 
Germany was, for Hughes, an affirmation of the true spiritual values of European 
civilisation. Having completed a quick tour of Germany and attended the 1936 
Nuremburg rally, Hughes returned to England full of admiration for the new Nazi 
order. In a pamphlet he wrote entitled The New Germany (1936: 1-2, 18), he described 
Germany as a country that 'in the truest sense of the word was a nation; a living 
whole of concordant wills; a people regenerate and restored, physically and morally 
sound, and set firmly and resolutely on the way towards grandiose masteries and 
achievements'. He spoke rapturously of the rally he had attended and reacted to the 
experience 1esthetically, 'the whole effect was faery, and seemed to be not of things 
of this earth'. Hughes was disappointed by the fact that many of the anti-Christians 
in England were on the Left. Pro-Nazis, he lamented, tended to be Christians (Hughes 
to Jacques Delebecque, 15 March 1938, Papers, 19:243). 
For Hughes, however, Nazi Germany was important because it was anti-semitic 
and anti-Christian. Hughes also believed that the Nazi regime had much in common 
with the ancient Greeks, for Hughes the source of European civilisation. Writing to 
Edwyn Bevan he claimed that 'Aristotle's view of the individual to the state was 
singularly like that which has been enforced in Germany; and Plato took in a large 
degree the Greek counterpart ofNazi Germany as the model for his ideal Republic' 
(Hughes to Bevan, 15 June 1940, Papers, 7:333). Regimentation and order were not 
alien to the Greeks, and Hughes argued that the famous Melian oration in Thucydides 
was Hitlerism raised to the ninth power. For Hughes the Nazis were the true modem 
heirs of the Greek heritage, even down to the cruelty and harshness of the Nazi regime. 
There was much, contended Hughes, that was dark and troubled in the Greek temper 
(Hughes to Chisholm, 15 June 1940, Papers, 4: 419). 
Again, Hughes's cultural critique of Christianity owed most to his idealised 
vision of the Graeco-Roman tradition which he viewed as the true European tradition 
and expressing true European values. He believed that there was an essential core to 
European civilisation and that the issue at hand was to restore that core. His aristocratic 
vision did not require an elite that would create new values in the face of nihilism. 
Unlike his friend Alan Chisholm, Hughes was not fixated on Spengler, modem nihilism 
and the need for a new 'art myth' (Chisholm 1933, 1934, Papers, Box 2, Exercise 
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Book: 47). In this sense he was closer to Maurras than Nietzsche; it was a matter of 
purifying European civilisation based on Graeco-Roman values by 'expelling' the 
alien 'oriental' influence of Christianity. Part of the reason for Hughes's simple and 
clear view on this matter is that intellectually he never left the nineteenth century. 
Truth was unproblematical for him and he saw it as a jewel hidden in the rubbish of 
the modem world. 
Nor was Hughes's attitude altered by the outcome of the war. In 1945 he 
continued to speak of the 'spirit of disinterested service in Nazism ... moral discipline ... 
a vast amount of idealism' (Hughes to Cockett, 2 January 1945, Papers, 1 0:347). He 
continued 'there is something tragic in the fact that all this idealism and its good 
practical human results have been shattered out of existence'. Hughes did not regret 
the Holocaust; his only regret was that America had triumphed over civilisation. 
Hughes's support for the Nazis had rested on their radical opposition to Christianity. 
He detested authoritarian Christian regimes. He denounced the Vichy regime 
established in France in 1940 because he saw it as reactionary and clerical in nature: 
'the whole force of Roman Catholic Obscurantism', he claimed, 'is being laid like a 
curse on the whole of French life' (Hughes to Bevan, 6 August 1940, Papers, 7:343). 
Nor was Hughes's attitude to Christianity softened by the events of World War II. 
Writing to Bernard Cockett in 1945 he contended that the sooner Christianity was 
swept away 'the better it will be for Mind and Morality in the Highest and the progress 
of the true life of the Spirit' (Hughes to Cockett, 2 January 1945, Papers, 1 0:339). 
Hughes's Theology 
Hughes's religion was not just defined by his reaction to Christianity. At the 
level of civilisation Hughes considered himself as belonging to an aristocratic tradition 
that embodied the true creativity and spirituality of European civilisation. According 
to Hughes the members of this 'intellectual and spiritual elect' included Lucretius, 
Bruno, Goethe, Shelley, Swinburne and Nietzsche (Hughes to Carl Kaeppel, 17 
November 1937, Papers, 9:293). Describing the Casuals Club ofpre-World War I 
Sydney, he wrote of Christopher Brennan presiding at its meetings and 'looking like 
a pontiff of what Novalis called the Invisible Church' (Hughes to Chisholm, 9 
December 1946, Papers, 4:551 ). Hughes liked to think of himself as an honoured 
member of this 'invisible church': he liked to think that his work would contribute 
not only to its continuation but also to its spiritual progress through creative acts that 
brought beauty into the world. This idea of an almost secret Brotherhood passing 
true spirituality from one generation to the next appealed to both his vanity and to his 
aristocratic elitism. He wanted that such illumination be restricted to the sacred few 
while the democratic masses were left to their own devices. 
Hughes combined the belief that artistic creation is the central spiritual and 
religious act with a faith in spiritual progress. These two elements define what may 
be termed his 'theology'. Again this belief in progress indicates the essentially 
nineteenth century cast of Hughes's mind. As mentioned earlier Hughes believed 
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There was much, contended Hughes, that was dark and troubled in the Greek temper 
(Hughes to Chisholm, 15 June 1940, Papers, 4: 419). 
Again, Hughes's cultural critique of Christianity owed most to his idealised 
vision of the Graeco-Roman tradition which he viewed as the true European tradition 
and expressing true European values. He believed that there was an essential core to 
European civilisation and that the issue at hand was to restore that core. His aristocratic 
vision did not require an elite that would create new values in the face of nihilism. 
Unlike his friend Alan Chisholm, Hughes was not fixated on Spengler, modem nihilism 
and the need for a new 'art myth' (Chisholm 1933, 1934, Papers, Box 2, Exercise 
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continued 'there is something tragic in the fact that all this idealism and its good 
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Hughes's support for the Nazis had rested on their radical opposition to Christianity. 
He detested authoritarian Christian regimes. He denounced the Vichy regime 
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Hughes's religion was not just defined by his reaction to Christianity. At the 
level of civilisation Hughes considered himself as belonging to an aristocratic tradition 
that embodied the true creativity and spirituality of European civilisation. According 
to Hughes the members of this 'intellectual and spiritual elect' included Lucretius, 
Bruno, Goethe, Shelley, Swinburne and Nietzsche (Hughes to Carl Kaeppel, 17 
November 1937, Papers, 9:293). Describing the Casuals Club ofpre-World War I 
Sydney, he wrote of Christopher Brennan presiding at its meetings and 'looking like 
a pontiff of what Novalis called the Invisible Church' (Hughes to Chisholm, 9 
December 1946, Papers, 4:551 ). Hughes liked to think of himself as an honoured 
member ofthis 'invisible church': he liked to think that his work would contribute 
not only to its continuation but also to its spiritual progress through creative acts that 
brought beauty into the world. This idea of an almost secret Brotherhood passing 
true spirituality from one generation to the next appealed to both his vanity and to his 
aristocratic elitism. He wanted that such illumination be restricted to the sacred few 
while the democratic masses were left to their own devices. 
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religious act with a faith in spiritual progress. These two elements define what may 
be termed his 'theology'. Again this belief in progress indicates the essentially 
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that God is not yet complete 'but that it is on the way to becoming such' (Hughes to 
Jack Lindsay, 15 May 1936, Papers, 15: 15). Writing of the poet Algernon Swinburne, 
Hughes identified Swinburne as an adherent of the doctrine oftheantrophy: 'Man, or 
rather the Soul of Man, is God' (Hughes, 1937:742). There is a process of'becoming' 
so that through culture and the perfection of humanity 'man makes himself God'. It 
is not clear the extent to which Hughes himself advocated theantrophy, but he appears 
to have adhered to something close to it. He believed that the Deity, or spirit, was 
striving towards totality but was still a long way from its goal and might not reach it. 
The success of this endeavour 'depends largely on us; for we are part of the deity, it 
is working thro' us as well as in us'. This human success was, according to Hughes, 
'seen at its highest in the productions of the mind of man, and especially in art' 
(Hughes to Jack Lindsay, 15 May 1936, Papers, 15: 15). This view of progress or 
development as the triumph of the universal and the creation of perfection is not 
really all that far away from the position put forward by (the atheist) Gordon Childe 
in his later work on epistemology Society and Knowledge (1956). Which is not all 
that surprising given that they were both products of a similar milieu- the University 
of Sydney before 1914 - and shared at least one friend in common, Jack Lindsay. 
Hughes, ironically, identified his position with that of the Jewish philosopher 
Samuel Alexander. He emphasised the fact that the deity was a long way from having 
achieved perfection and that the achievement of that perfection was far from 
guaranteed. He wanted to underline the need for individuals to be active 'in the service 
of that Spirit' (Hughes to Bevan, I 0 May 1935, Papers, 7:73, 77). His primary 
objection to Christianity was that the doctrines of an omnipotent God and the atonement 
encouraged passivity and fatalism, a 'slave morality'. As an advocate of a 'producer 
mentality' Hughes here resembles John Anderson as well as Gordon Chi Ide (Maddock, 
1995:117). It was crucial for him that the deity be made 'active in this life', God 
must be considered as an active principle who helps to propel individuals along the 
path to spiritual perfection. 'The transcendental', claimed Hughes, 'must be operant 
and accessible in experience as we know it here and now ... felt and realizable in this 
life' (Hughes to Lindfield, 6 December 1936, Papers, 14:415). 
If God was both active in this world and incomplete then, for Hughes, the 
work of the artist and the creator was crucial if God was ever to attain perfection. The 
progress of the Spirit rested heavily on the artistic endeavours of the spiritual elite of 
the Invisible Church. Art makes the transcendental present, hence his view that religion 
is found more in the music than in the meaning of the words being sung (Hughes, 
1933:617). I think that this also explains his susceptibility to the theatre of Nazi 
Nuremburg and its fairyland. In particular Hughes was an advocate ofthe special 
role of poetry as that form of creative endeavour that would bring man and spirit 
together. Writing ofMallarme, Hughes described Symbolist poetry as both an act of 
genuine creation and a revelation of transcendental forces. Symbolist ~esthetics both 
reconciles man to the world 'as he experiences it' and leads him to a country 'which 
he will recognise as his true home, and wherein his spirit may find repose'. Symbolist 
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~esthetics is a religion; it possesses both a spiritual and a mystical dimension but has 
the advantage of not making 'impossible demands upon the reason'. Its appeal is to 
the 'highest part of man', and to 'what is highest in the transcendental world'. Hughes 
concluded by claiming that 'it offers him sure salvation, and salvation of the only 
acceptable sort' (Hughes, 1934: 122-3). Hughes's advocacy of Symbolism as a sort 
of gnostic aristocratic religion is remarkably unproblematic. There is no angst as one 
might expect in dealing with negative theology and the absence of God. Instead 
Symbolism becomes in Hughes's hands a source of comfort that reconciles him to 
the world. For Hughes there is progress in the world but its agents are not liberals or 
socialists but the creative few of which he believed himself to be one. This is not so 
much a rejection of nineteenth theories of progress as an adaptation ofthem. 
One issue remains to be addressed regarding Hughes's theology and that is 
the relationship between religion and politics. Writing to Bevan in 1940, he argued 
that politics and the spiritual realm are distinct and separate provinces (Hughes to 
Bevan, 13 August 1940, Papers, 7:359). The spiritual is primary and the role of the 
state is to create those conditions under which spiritual and artistic creation is possible. 
The state must be efficient and it must provide that measure of material security 
without which artistic creation is not possible. Democracy does not provide the 
necessary conditions for spiritual achievement, it is inefficient and wasteful. In the 
final analysis Hughes's vision ofNazi Germany as the ideal form of polity rested on 
his belief that it was a place where genuine creative artistic endeavour could flourish. 
Again it was an issue of restoration: the Nazis were, for Hughes, returning the European 
order to its true roots. 
Conclusion 
Hughes's religion is best described as a cult of the beautiful in which the creative 
artist has a special role as one who advances the spirit, or deity, towards perfection. It 
embodied an aristocratic ethos that emphasised the classical virtues of independence 
and courage as those virtues that would encourage individuals to be active and work 
for the cause of the advancement of spirit. Along with spiritual progress Hughes 
also sought a restoration of what he believed to be the true values of European 
civilisation which he saw as embodied in its Graeco-Roman roots. Hughes's faith in 
spiritual progress and his desire to restore the true Europe perhaps seem at odds. 
They can only be combined if one accepts that there is some sort of metaphysical 
order in the universe that manifests itself not as something fixed and eternal but as a 
process that manifests itself progressively in time. According to this view good and 
true progress is defined by its telos, which for Hughes is the creation of beauty through 
creative endeavour. Whatever prevents the 'creative elect' from engaging in acts of 
artistic creation, in his eyes Christianity and democracy, are destructive of spiritual 
progress and therefore evil. His ideas on these matters were fixed and certain; like 
Maurras he was narrow-minded and obsessive on these key issues that mattered to 
him. His devotion to art as the highest form of religious and spiritual activity was 
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Symbolism becomes in Hughes's hands a source of comfort that reconciles him to 
the world. For Hughes there is progress in the world but its agents are not liberals or 
socialists but the creative few of which he believed himself to be one. This is not so 
much a rejection of nineteenth theories of progress as an adaptation of them. 
One issue remains to be addressed regarding Hughes's theology and that is 
the relationship between religion and politics. Writing to Bevan in 1940, he argued 
that politics and the spiritual realm are distinct and separate provinces (Hughes to 
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The state must be efficient and it must provide that measure of material security 
without which artistic creation is not possible. Democracy does not provide the 
necessary conditions for spiritual achievement, it is inefficient and wasteful. In the 
final analysis Hughes's vision ofNazi Germany as the ideal form ofpo1ity rested on 
his belief that it was a place where genuine creative artistic endeavour could flourish. 
Again it was an issue of restoration: the Nazis were, for Hughes, returning the European 
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Conclusion 
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artist has a special role as one who advances the spirit, or deity, towards perfection. It 
embodied an aristocratic ethos that emphasised the classical virtues of independence 
and courage as those virtues that would encourage individuals to be active and work 
for the cause of the advancement of spirit. Along with spiritual progress Hughes 
also sought a restoration of what he believed to be the true values of European 
civilisation which he saw as embodied in its Graeco-Roman roots. Hughes's faith in 
spiritual progress and his desire to restore the true Europe perhaps seem at odds. 
They can only be combined if one accepts that there is some sort of metaphysical 
order in the universe that manifests itself not as something fixed and eternal but as a 
process that manifests itself progressively in time. According to this view good and 
true progress is defined by its telos, which for Hughes is the creation of beauty through 
creative endeavour. Whatever prevents the 'creative elect' from engaging in acts of 
artistic creation, in his eyes Christianity and democracy, are destructive of spiritual 
progress and therefore evil. His ideas on these matters were fixed and certain; like 
Maurras he was narrow-minded and obsessive on these key issues that mattered to 
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absolute. He was, in may ways, a fundamentalist. 
It can be argued that Hughes did not resemble the typical British Nazi 
sympathiser of the 1930s, who, as Hughes points out, could, like Nesta Webster, be a 
good Christian (Rubinstein, 1996:149-151). He was not upset either by Nazi policy 
towards the Church or the regime's increasingly violent anti-semitism. The ebbing 
of the Nazi tide in Britain in 1938 did not affect Hughes who continued to seek 
contact with Nazi officials (Melleuish, 2000:379). Although opposed to Communism 
it was not anti-communism that fuelled his enthusiasm for the Nazis (Griffiths, 1980). 
Nor was Hughes ever a true Maurrasian intellectually; he did not believe in the 
Catholic, Latin and Classical vision of Europe. Hughes's significant classical past 
was Greek rather than Roman. In this he remained close to the Romantic vision of 
Brennan who preferred Homer to Virgil, and who possessed no enthusiasm for the 
French Monarchists (Brennan, 1962: 429-31 ). Indeed one looks in vain to France 
for influences on Hughes; he was hostile to the 'spiritualistic' fascism of Thierry 
Maulnier who he called 'superficially clever', and despised Robert Brasillach (Hughes, 
1935:691 ). In the final analysis Hughes's religious and spiritual beliefs have more in 
common with Julius Evola who derived his inspiration from the German 'Conservative 
Revolution', and the French New Right of the 1970s whose chief theorist Alain de 
Benoist advocated a return to a pre-Christian paganism (Ferraresi, 1987; Eatwell 
1995:248-9). 
It can also be argued that Hughes's religious vision can be explained in terms 
of the relationship between his personal history and his intellectual development. As 
a young man he developed a Romantic disposition in reaction to what he perceived 
as an alien and hostile 'democratic' society around him. As a student he imbibed an 
aristocratic ethos that convinced him that he was one of the creative elect who had 
access to special knowledge in the shape ofliterature and art that the ordinary people, 
sunk in democracy and Christianity, did not. At the same time he absorbed both a 
devotion to the values of antiquity, in particular Greece, and an underlying belief in 
progress as a spiritual process. Insecure in his own capacities he turned this devotion 
into a set of fixed dogmas to which he held passionately. It was this insecurity that 
pushed him to confront Christians, to assert the truth of his own beliefs and to support 
the Nazis. Hughes appropriated the idea of the artistic elite creating God because it 
justified his own creative endeavours; he saw the Nazis creating the type of society in 
which he would be respected. Needless to say, his vision ofNational Socialist Germany 
as a haven for the creative few was a fabrication of his own imagination. 
The problem with Hughes's religion was that it was meant be the religion of a 
small cultivated artistic elite and he took pride in its elitist qualities. As such it could 
only ever be attractive to the gnostic few. In this way it could be considered a somewhat 
harmless eccentricity for an educated few. But unfortunately Hughes wanted more; 
he wanted this elite to be respected and honoured by those who were unable to be 
members of the 'Brotherhood'. In a democratic society this is not possible because 
democratic pluralism does not recognise such claims of superiority. Hence Hughes 
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was drawn to authoritarian regimes such as National Socialist Gennany in the hope 
of creating a social order in which his superiority would be recognised. And that is 
where the danger of religious beliefs such as his lies. It was no accident that Hughes 
was drawn to fascism which has exerted an attraction for many intellectuals in search 
of spiritual renewal or restoration (Sternell 1996: Chapter 7) 
There is a peculiar pathos surrounding Randolph Hughes. His ego was greater 
than his talents and his life was one of passion, instability, quarrels and attempts to 
assert himself over others. He forged himself a set of religious beliefs as a means of 
justifYing himself to the world as an important creative individual defending true 
religion against what he saw as the forces of darkness ranging from Christianity to 
democracy. Whatever his psychological insecurities may have been, he held to these 
religious ideals in a dogmatic and absolute fashion such that it would not be 
inappropriate to call him a fundamentalist. He can be seen as having become the 
victim ofhis passions and his dogmatism. The saddest thing of all is that as he became 
older he became more bitter and twisted. And that is how he died. 
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only ever be attractive to the gnostic few. In this way it could be considered a somewhat 
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members of the 'Brotherhood'. In a democratic society this is not possible because 
democratic pluralism does not recognise such claims of superiority. Hence Hughes 
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assert himself over others. He forged himself a set of religious beliefs as a means of 
justifYing himself to the world as an important creative individual defending true 
religion against what he saw as the forces of darkness ranging from Christianity to 
democracy. Whatever his psychological insecurities may have been, he held to these 
religious ideals in a dogmatic and absolute fashion such that it would not be 
inappropriate to call him a fundamentalist. He can be seen as having become the 
victim ofhis passions and his dogmatism. The saddest thing of all is that as he became 
older he became more bitter and twisted. And that is how he died. 
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The Religious Contribution Of Dutch 
Migrants To Multicultural Australia 
GaryD Bouma 
Monash University 
The religious consequences of Dutch migration to Australia have been 
noticeable and enriching. Dutch migrants introduced a new religious 
group to Australia- The Reformed Churches in Australia (Deenick, 1991), 
strengthened a number of Catholic parishes and Presbyterian 
congregations, and swelled the ranks of those claiming to have 'no 
religion' (Victorian Office of Ethnic Affairs, 1991:15, 20, 27). The 
settlement of Dutch migrants has involved the introduction of Dutch 
religious orientations and expectations some fitting easily into the 
Australian relaxed attitude toward religion while others did not. Dutch 
migrants have also brought orientations to the wcrys religious groups are 
supposed to relate to each other that contribute to issues of religious 
diversity facing Australian society. This paper will describe some features 
of the religious institution of Holland as a backdrop to understanding 
some of the contributions made by Dutch migrants to Australia. 
59 
Religious settlement refers to the processes involved in the movement from 
one socio-cultural location to another of a religion, or a religious group. (see Bouma, 
1994, 1995a, 1995b and 1997). The processes involved in religious settlement have 
become more obvious in Australia as post-war migration brought a wider range of 
religions to Australia including Islam, various strains of Orthodox Christianity, 
Buddhism and Hinduism. While each of these religious groups has had a small number 
of adherents in Australia prior to 1947, they have now grown to become significant 
minority religious communities. Each of these 'new-to-Australia' religions has made 
an impact on Australian religious life and on the interaction of religious groups in 
Australia. 
Religious Institution and Religious Settlement 
Each society has a religious institution- a set of norms governing the ways 
religious groups interact, specifYing the levels of appropriate religious activity, and 
setting the range of religious practice and belief considered acceptable (Bouma, 1998). 
Religious institutions are distinct from such religious organisational structures as 
churches, schools, convents, denominational or congregational structures. A society's 
religious institution shapes and directs the interactions of religious groups and religious 
activity found in or introduced to the society by immigration or by conversion. An 
